This paper examines whether key legislative and regulatory frameworks for the provision of water services in Sydney, Australia, successfully support the complex task of planning and managing urban water systems to balance water security, cost and sustainability considerations. The challenges of managing urban water systems under a changing and uncertain climate became starkly apparent during Australia's 'Millennium Drought', a decade-long period of extremely dry conditions throughout the 2000s. As the drought progressed, several state and territory governments assumed control of planning and approvals processes in order to implement large water-supply infrastructure projects with great urgency. However, at the end of the decade La Niña rains saturated catchments, spilled over dam walls and devastated several communities with flooding. Analysis of the frameworks for third-party access, private-sector participation, planning, and water-conservation initiatives reveals that the rules, roles and responsibilities of the many actors are interlinked but not always effectively integrated. The introduction and expansion of competition in the urban water industry are an ongoing experiment with great influence on the governance of the sector and the ways in which water services are planned for and provided.
Introduction
The challenges of managing urban water systems under a changing and uncertain climate became starkly apparent during the 'Millennium Drought', a decade-long period of extremely dry conditions across southern Australia throughout the 2000s. For most city dwellers, by the onset of the Millennium Drought more than a generation had passed since the prospect of water shortages had last had a direct impact on daily life (Keating, 1992; Sydney Water, 2009 ). This protected experience ended when restrictions on outdoor water uses were imposed in many Australian metropolitan areas, with the aim of slowing the decline of water storage levels (Chong et al., 2009) . As the drought progressed, several state and territory governments assumed control of planning and approvals processes in order to implement large water-supply infrastructure projects, notably desalination plants, with great urgency. However, in 2009 and 2010 across south-east Australia, the drought broke with the arrival of La Niña rains that saturated catchments, spilled over dam walls and afflicted many communities with devastating floods.
The water-use restrictions and major infrastructure developments implemented in response to the drought sparked heated debate about the effectiveness and appropriateness of the regulatory and institutional architecture of the urban water sector (National Water Commission, 2011) . This stemmed from concerns about the alleged failure of governments to plan for and adequately invest in water supply systems; the financial, ecological and sustainability impacts of infrastructure; and the extent to which planning processes geared towards rapid deployment of infrastructure sacrificed processes that would have otherwise ensured transparency and community engagement (National Water Commission, 2011) . The most recent cycle of rainfall extremes, and the controversies surrounding approaches to secure water supplies, have refocused the reform spotlight on the settings underpinning the supply and management of water for Australian cities. National government advisory bodies have found that significant further reforms are urgently required, despite several decades of reform built on national competition principles intended to promote innovation and efficiency (National Water Commission, 2011; Productivity Commission, 2011) . This paper critically examines whether key legislative and regulatory frameworks for the urban water sector in metropolitan Sydney, Australia, successfully support the complex task of planning and managing systems to balance water security, cost and sustainability considerations. The analysis and lessons presented have widespread relevance for those grappling with urban water reform and integrated planning internationally. Across many countries, regulators, participants and stakeholders are currently being challenged by questions of how to balance often competing policy objectives of access, affordability, equity, environmental protection and economic efficiency (François et al., 2010; Bayliss, 2011) . Moreover, climate change, uncertainty and extreme droughts and floods, such as those typical of the Australian climate, are increasingly adding complexity to ensuring water security (Parry et al., 2007) .
The paper focuses on the provision of water services but notes that wastewater services are integrated and there are significant overlaps in the case of recycling. The conceptualisation of 'climate-readiness' centres on the provision of services under a changing climate, amongst other climate-change issues relevant to the urban water sector (Water Services Association of Australia, 2012a) . The questions it addresses are:
• Have key legislative and regulatory frameworks facilitated 'climate-ready' urban water systems: that is, do they ensure secure and reliable water services under more variable, less certain and potentially drier climate conditions, as expected for the Sydney region? (NSW Office of Water, 2010) • Do these frameworks balance the goal of water security with cost-effectiveness (value for money in terms of the options implemented to save or supply water), sustainability and other public-interest considerations?
• Do the competition reform elements embedded within the legislative and regulatory frameworks drive or inhibit the achievement of these multiple objectives?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a brief description of the supply and demand for water and the institutional arrangements for the delivery of services in the Sydney metropolitan region. Section 3 outlines the urban water reform process in Australia. The legal and regulatory frameworks underpinning three key areas are then analysed: third-party access and private-sector participation in urban water service provision, particularly via recycling (Section 4); development controls, the planning regime and their application to water infrastructure (Section 5); and water conservation initiatives (Section 6). The risks to water supplies from coal-seam gas exploration and mining are beyond the scope of this paper but are, importantly, being addressed by others (National Water Commission, 2010; Cubby, 2012) . Section 7 concludes. The paper outlines the many actors and their involvement in regulating and supplying water services in Sydney. As a guide, key examples of the statutory basis for these responsibilities are summarised in Figure 1 , but this diagram necessarily contains a sample rather than a comprehensive map of obligations.
A brief description of metropolitan Sydney's water services system

Supply and demand
Most of the water supplied to greater metropolitan Sydney's population of approximately 4.6 million is sourced from catchment-based run-off. Warragamba Dam is the main storage and, at over 2,000 gigalitres in size, is one of the largest in the world in terms of per-capita capacity (Department of Environment, 2010; Sydney Catchment Authority, 2012a) . By 2015, alternative sources of desalination and recycling initiatives are expected to supply about a quarter of Sydney's water needs, including via private-sector involvement in provision, as outlined in Section 3. Households consume about 73 per cent of all water used in greater Sydney. Water efficiency programmes for residences and businesses and increasing numbers of recycling initiatives have successfully reduced demand per person per day from 506 litres in 1990 -1991 to 314 litres in 2009 (Department of Environment, 2010 .
Mandatory restrictions on outdoor watering were in place in Sydney from 2003 to 2005. These restrictions were nominally enforced through a system of fines, but compliance was achieved through public education and monitoring by members of the public. Sprinkler use was banned and watering by hand-held hose or dripper systems was only allowed from 4 pm to 10 pm on certain days of the week (Chong et al., 2009) . As the drought progressed and dam levels fell, the New South Wales (NSW) State Government commissioned a desalination plant at Kurnell, at a cost of AU$2 billion (billion ¼ 10 9 ). The plant has a capacity of up to 90 gigalitres per year (about 15 per cent of current water use) and is designed with the potential for a doubling in capacity in the event of a future severe drought (Department of Environment, 2010). However, high rainfall levels that occurred since the drought broke in 2010 resulted in an overflowing Warragamba Dam by March 2012 (Sydney Catchment Authority, 2012b ) and led to the plant being switched off in July 2012. In May 2012, the NSW Government leased the Sydney Desalination Plant Pty Ltd to a private international consortium. At the end of the 50-year lease agreement, the ownership will be transferred to the lessee (Sydney Water, 2012a).
Institutions and governance
The governance arrangements underlying the supply of water to greater Sydney reflect the competition reform principles articulated in the National Competition Policy, as outlined in Section 3.
Water is supplied by the Sydney Water Corporation (SWC), a statutory state-owned corporation (SOC) that operates in accordance with the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) and its operating licence (Sydney Water, 2010) . The responsibility for protecting the quality and quantity of water in catchment areas and for bulk water in the Sydney region lies with the Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA), established in 1998 under the Sydney Water Catchment Management Act 1998 (NSW) (McKay, 2005) .
The multiple objectives for SWC, as outlined in its operating licence, include: being a successful business; having regard for the interests of the communities; complying with the principles of ecologically sustainable development and preventing the degradation of the environment; and protecting and reducing risks to public health (Sydney Water, 2010) . The dual nature of the 'private business' and 'public entity' objectives underlies the intricacy of legislative, regulatory and governance arrangements required to enable achievement of these multiple goals.
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) is the economic regulator with a primary function, in the water sector, to determine the maximum prices that can be charged for water and wastewater services. IPART also monitors SWC's and SCA's compliance with their respective operating licences, and has regulatory and administrative functions with regard to licensing private-sector provision of water services.
The development of the Metropolitan Water Plan, which outlines the mix of measures planned to ensure water security for greater Sydney, is coordinated by NSW Government (Department of Environment, 2010) . The 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan includes a portfolio of water supply options including desalination, recycling, stormwater harvesting, and drought-readiness measures. It emphasises the need for diversification as well as flexibility to respond and adapt to challenges presented by a highly variable climate, droughts, and climate change (Department of Environment, 2010).
Background to reform in the Australian urban water sector
The process of strategic reform of the Australian water industry has its origins in the National Competition Policy (NCP), implemented from 1995 to 2005 by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) (Productivity Commission, 2005) . The NCP was based on the recommendations of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Inquiry), which endorsed the principle that competitive markets would generally best serve the interests of consumers and the community, by creating incentives that promote supplier innovation and efficient operations (Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy, 1993; Productivity Commission, 2005) . The guidelines established by the resultant Competition Principles Agreement concerning the structural reform and regulation of public monopolies underpinned the reform of government monopolies in various service-provision sectors, including ultimately the corporatisation of urban water businesses (as government trading enterprises) and the establishment of price-regulatory functions of government agencies.
In 1994, COAG adopted a strategic framework for water industry reform, which was subsequently linked to AU$16 billion of payments made available by the Commonwealth to incentivise State and Territory implementation of the NCP agreements over 1997 -1998 (Lyster et al., 2009 . A key element of the 1994 urban water reform package was the separation of policy setting, regulatory enforcement and service-delivery functions of government agencies (National Water Commission, 2011) . The 1994 reforms also required a restructuring of water tariffs and reduction of cross-subsidies in line with cost-reflective pricing. The intention, although ultimately not the overarching outcome, was that governments would set clear policy objectives for the sector, and provide water utilities with the autonomy to deliver services that met these objectives.
Between 2004 and 2006, all Australian governments signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water initiative (NWI), which included the establishment of the National Water Commission (NWC) to advise COAG on water issues and progress under the NWI. The NWI commitments and its approach to addressing environmental considerations predominantly relate to non-urban water issues. Nevertheless, the NWI commitments included a limited set of urban water actions, largely focused on pricing (Council of Australian Governments, 2004) . In 2008, COAG agreed to a further set of actions to progress urban water reforms (Council of Australian Governments, 2008) . The actions relevant to preparing the sector for climate change included publishing guidance on best-practice scenario planning for climate variability; promoting private-sector participation through third-party access; and establishing and funding major research centres for recycling and desalination.
In its 2009 biennial assessment of progress against the NWI, the NWC found that the NWI did not sufficiently guide urban water reform, and that 'new challenges have presented themselves [that were] not as evident when the NWI was signed' (National Water Commission, 2011, p. 57) . These challenges included uncertainty about rainfall and run-off levels due to climate change. In its 2011 assessment of future directions for the urban water sector in Australia, the NWC found that, despite some progress, there are ongoing inadequacies in the policy and institutional settings for urban water, including unclear specification of responsibilities of the various agencies involved and a lack of agreed objectives for the sector.
Third-party access: recycling and the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW)
Origins of the NSW third-party access regime for water
Regulatory arrangements to enable third-party access to 'essential' infrastructure services were a key pillar of promoting the competition objectives of the NCP. Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (replaced in 2011 by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) created a national access regime to enable access by parties, other than the infrastructure owner, to network facilities. The purpose of access regulation is to enable access to services provided by infrastructure or other facilities that are not easily obtainable through commercial negotiation because of the natural monopoly characteristics of the infrastructure and facilities in question. Statutory third-party access regimes also provide a framework for an independent regulatory agency to arbitrate the terms of access where the infrastructure owner and the third-party access seeker fail to agree on the terms of access (Gray & Gardner, 2008) .
The effectiveness of Part IIIA in enabling access to urban water infrastructure was tested by the application by Services Sydney Pty Ltd. After failed negotiations with Sydney Water to gain access to its sewerage-regulation network in order to treat and recycle sewage water for non-potable purposes including agriculture, industrial and domestic uses and environmental flows, Services Sydney sought declaration of various sewerage networks under the TPA Part IIIA. Sydney Water opposed the application on many grounds including cost and concerns about consumer protection, public safety, and environmental standards, but after initial delays the Australian Competition Tribunal declared the service for a 50-year period. However, a dispute over access-pricing methodology followed. The results of arbitration found in Sydney Water's favour, and Services Sydney did not subsequently take up access (Gray & Gardner, 2008; Abbott & Cohen, 2011) .
This test case was a catalyst for the introduction of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) (WICA), which established a state-based access regime. The NSW Government's motivation for introducing the regime was to facilitate competitive service provision and to promote innovative solutions such as sewer mining that had potential for supplying water throughout drought (Gray & Gardner, 2008; National Competition Council, 2009) . As required by WICA, as 5 years have passed since its introduction, the Minister is currently reviewing the Act (NSW Government, 2011).
Water Industry Competition Act
4.2.1. Features of WICA. The objectives of WICA and associated regulations are wide-ranging and ambitious. The core elements are the establishment of a licensing scheme for private-sector providers of reticulated drinking water, recycled water and sewerage services; the establishment of a third-party access regime for water and sewerage infrastructure; and provisions to authorise IPART to facilitate resolution of disputes over access to infrastructure (Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) ). Unlike Part IIIA, there are no merit-review processes for access decisions under WICA, which can only be tested by judicial review (Crosbie, 2009) . Since the introduction of WICA, no applications for sewernetwork access have been received or granted; the only access undertaking to date has been sought by Sydney Water to enable access by the operators of the Sydney Desalination Plant to the drinking supply network (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012a) . The adequacy of disputemechanism elements regarding access have thus not had to be tested in practice.
Regulation of private-sector participation in recycling has been enabled in a number of cases through WICA's licensing provisions. Under part 2 of WICA, the two types of licences that may be applied for are a network operator's licence and a retail supplier's licence (Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) pts 3, 4; Explanatory Notes, Water Industry Competition Bill 2006 (NSW)). In applying for a network licence, the applicant must provide comprehensive statements with regard to: the activities; minimising risks to their ability to carry out the activities; technical details about the system including information on how safe and reliable supplies will be ensured if infrastructure is inoperable; and addressing relevant guidelines for managing health and environmental risks (Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (NSW) s 6). Applicants for a retail supplier's licence must address similar issues (Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (NSW) s 10).
A raft of government agencies provide advice for each WICA licence approvals process. Licence applications are lodged with IPART, which invites and considers submissions from those Ministers administering the Public Health Act 1991 (NSW), the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPAA), the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), as well as the public (Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) s 9). Before granting a retail supplier's licence, the Minister must be satisfied that activities will be carried out without presenting a significant risk of harm to the environment. Licence conditions for network operators and retail suppliers include compliance with plumbing codes and regulatory requirements for water quality; reporting of information relating to incidents that could threaten public health or the environment; the preparation, publication and auditing of operating and management plans; and other conditions imposed by the Minister (Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW) s 13).
WICA requires licensees of recycling schemes to address the 12 elements of the risk-management framework detailed in the 'Australian Guidelines for Water Recycling: Managing Health and Environmental Risks' (AGWR) (Water Industry Competition (General) Regulation 2008 (NSW) s 6(1)(d)). These Guidelines include rigorous validation requirements and are designed to ensure that users or the environment are not exposed to undue risks.
WICA also includes 'retailer of last resort' (RoLR) provisions that aim to protect customers and ensure continuity of services in the event that a private retail supplier fails to provide services. These arrangements are currently under review and the discussion paper released by the State Government has identified a number of gaps in the regulatory arrangements (NSW Department of Finance & Services, 2011) . For example, the legislation does not specify commercial parameters or cost-recovery requirements, leaving SWC (and hence its customer base) potentially exposed to bearing the costs of stepping in to act as retailer in the event that a private retailer fails to provide services. Further, WICA does not include arrangements for 'operators of last resort' (OoLR), which would be designed to respond to network operator failure, including the protection of 'off-grid' communities that are not otherwise connected to mains networks. The consequences of supplier failure have fortunately not eventuated in practice, but the issues around RoLR and OoLR arrangements illustrate the crucial role of regulation of private-sector involvement.
4.2.2. The influence of WICA on water recycling: evidence and issues. A total of 19 licences have been granted by IPART for nine schemes across Sydney (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012b) . One example is the 5.8 ha 'Central Park' urban village currently being developed near central Sydney. This development is expected to house approximately 5,000 residents and host more than 15,000 workers and visitors daily. A private company has applied for licences to own and operate drinking water, recycled water and sewerage infrastructure (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012c) . A climate-ready character is reflected in the scheme's diverse sources of water, including rainwater, stormwater, groundwater, sewage from onsite buildings, and via access to a SWC sewer main that lies underneath the site.
SWC also has an active role in many recycling schemes including public-private partnerships. One such example is the Rosehill Recycled Water Scheme, the first scheme licensed under WICA (Water Services Association of Australia, 2012b), which supplies recycled water for industry and irrigation in western Sydney. A private consortium built, owns, and operates the recycled water treatment plant and supply network (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012b); SWC has an agreement to purchase the recycled water from the private consortium and, in turn, sells water to industry customers (Sydney Water Corporation, 2009). As outlined above, WICA licensing focuses on ensuring safe and reliable service provision along with measures for protecting public health and the environment. The negotiating of the commercial terms of contracts between the various private and public parties, which can ultimately have implications in terms of risks and costs to the community, lies outside the economic regulatory framework.
To date, the schemes licensed under WICA represent a small proportion of the total number of recycling schemes and volume of water recycled across greater Sydney. SWC has developed and operates its own recycling schemes (Sydney Water, 2012b) and is required by its operating licences to comply with various health and environmental guidelines. Most recycling schemes in NSW are operated by councils, whose wastewater recycling operations (in non-metropolitan regions only) are regulated under section 60 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (LG Act). Although beyond the scope of this paper to address, there are a number of issues relating to the capacity of and support available to local councils to effectively apply the 12 steps of the AGWR (Power, 2010) . There are also numerous private schemes that do not, or do not yet, require licensing under WICA.
The regulatory and governance model for private-sector involvement underpinned by WICA directly reflects the principles of the pervasive competition and economic reform framework outlined in the NCP. The WICA review process (NSW Government, 2011) is expected to examine the extent to which private-sector involvement has yielded innovation and economic efficiency benefits, and to what extent health, environmental, amenity and other social considerations have been adequately protected by the broader regulatory frameworks.
5. Development assessment, the new planning regime and urban water infrastructure 'The reality is that two decades of governance reform has yet to keep politics out of the day to day management of water businesses, particularly during periods of crisis' (Water Services Association of Australia, 2011, p. 12).
'Major investment decisions made by governments remain beyond the scrutiny of economic regulators, even though those investments account for most increases in costs and hence price increases to customers ' (National Water Commission, 2011, p. viii) .
Of the broad suite of planning laws relevant to the provision of urban water services, those addressing development controls are particularly relevant to assessing and approving urban water infrastructure. The NSW planning regime is currently undergoing a major review, with expected significant changes to specific elements as well as to the overall architecture of the scheme (NSW Government, 2012) . Changes are expected to occur rapidly and be finalised by the end of 2013. During this current period of reform, it is timely to first revisit and critique the previous development-control provisions that facilitated the implementation of the major desalination infrastructure, as a basis of comparison with the emerging directions in the new planning regime as outlined in A New Planning System for New South Wales -Green Paper (NSW Government, 2012).
Development assessment of the Sydney desalination plant
In Sydney, as in many other cities, the drought of the 2000s precipitated the State Government assuming control of the process of development assessment and approval for the desalination plant. In 2004, as part of the Metropolitan Water Plan, the NSW Government had allocated funding to investigate desalination as an option for securing water supplies during drought, the main benefit being that desalination is a rainfallindependent source (White et al., 2006) . The newly appointed Premier of NSW announced in August 2005 that the desalination plant would be built 'drought or no drought' (Smith, 2005) , but this stance proved unpopular and the position was reversed in response to the recommendations of an expert panel commissioned to review the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (White et al., 2006) . As recommended by this review, in February 2006 the NSW Cabinet announced that the desalination plant would be integrated into an emergency drought-readiness strategy, and would be constructed only if dam levels dropped to 30 per cent (New South Wales Parliament, 2006). However, when dam levels fell to 35 per cent, the State Government announced that it had called for tenders for construction (White et al., 2008) . Immediately following this, the drought broke and the 30 per cent trigger point was never reached (Sydney Catchment Authority, 2012c).
Regulatory changes in the period shortly preceding the initiation of the desalination plant enabled the NSW Government to assume control over the approvals process. A new clause was entered into the State Environmental Planning Policy (Sydney Metropolitan Water Supply) 2004 enabling SWC to develop the desalination plant without development consent under Part 4 of the EPAA (Lyster et al., 2012) . The Minister exercised discretionary authority by declaring the plant a Part 3A project, of 'State or regional environmental significance', as well as 'critical infrastructure', which is 'essential for social, economic or environmental reasons' (Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Infrastructure and Other Planning Reform Act 2005 (NSW) s 1).
During its 6-year existence, Part 3A of the EPAA was criticised for the extent of discretion it allowed the Minister, its inadequate and uncoordinated assessment requirements, and for failing to achieve the objectives of the EPAA: specifically, that it did not require adequate consideration of ecologically sustainable development, climate change, consideration of alternatives, public participation or consultation, or appeals or judicial review (Ghanem & Ruddock, 2011; Carr, 2007 ; Minister for Planning v Walker (2008) 161 LGERA 423). Part 3A has since been repealed, but the current 'critical state-significant infrastructure' provisions are similar in process and scope.
During the process of developing the environmental assessment report (EAR), concerns about ecological impacts of the desalination plant, local environmental impacts, energy use and climate change impacts, inadequate public engagement and insufficient consideration of alternatives were raised by the community, non-government agencies, academics and businesses (Prince et al., 2006; NSW Government, 2006; Ghanem & Ruddock, 2011) . However, an independent panel appointed by the Minister to review matters regarding the Kurnell desalination plant found that all issues raised had been adequately addressed by the EAR process or in the Department's advice to the Minister (Prince et al., 2006) .
The issue of cost and the resultant financial impacts on communities were beyond the reach and objectives of the EPAA (Grafton & Kompas, 2006) . This relates to the specific 'pulling the trigger early' on the desalination plant, and concerns that opportunities for more cost-effective investment in urban water options had not previously been undertaken (UTS, 2007) . While the critical infrastructure provisions of the EPAA could be interpreted as enabling Ministerial flexibility to intervene in order to avert a water shortage 'crisis', the processes did not themselves enable cost-effective planning for urban water, nor did they constitute a mechanism for community concerns about financial impacts to be considered, nor an appeal to be made on this or any other basis. The case of the Sydney desalination plant illustrates the difficulties in separating government's roles as policy-maker and regulator from that of service provider.
A new planning regime: implications for urban water infrastructure
In July 2011, the newly elected NSW Government embarked upon a major review of the state's planning system. Recommendations of an Independent Review Paper were released in March 2012 and A New Planning System for New South Wales -Green Paper was released in July 2012 (NSW Government, 2012). The Green Paper proposes major changes to the planning system and presents several implications for strategic planning of urban water systems, environmental assessment and development control of water infrastructure, and private-sector participation in the provision of urban water services (NSW Government, 2012).
Strategic planning.
The Green Paper proposes a shift of focus and attention from development assessment to strategic planning. To achieve this, it proposes major structural change at all levels of the planning system to result in a spatially nested framework of strategic planning: NSW planning policies, metropolitan/regional growth plans, subregional delivery plans and local land-use plans (NSW Government, 2012) .
Within this proposed strategic planning framework, guidance for urban water infrastructure provision is included in the 20-year State Infrastructure Strategy (SIS) released in September 2012 (Infrastructure NSW, 2012) . This is intended to link to the metropolitan/regional growth plans, although how this linking will be achieved is not articulated within the Green Paper. The water section of the SIS does not make apparent whether it will contribute to filling gaps in the planning for cost-effective, sustainable water service provision for the metropolitan water area under changing climate conditions. The SIS refers to the Metropolitan Water Plan (MWP), but makes only the limited recommendation that the review of the MWP take into account infrastructure options.
The Green Paper also proposes to introduce a legislative basis for strategic plans, although the aims and character of this legislative basis have not yet been specified (NSW Government, 2012) . In the case of urban water, it is yet to be seen whether the new legislation will establish governance arrangements that appropriately support the process of planning and approvals for infrastructure. The Green Paper also proposes to include statutory requirements for community participation in the development of strategic plans, although it is also not clear whether this requirement will apply to metropolitan strategic plans, the level relevant to urban water service provision, or just to subregional delivery plans.
Environmental assessment and infrastructure approval.
Despite relatively limited specific reference to water service provision, there are elements of the Green Paper relating to environmental assessment and approval of infrastructure that are of clear relevance to the sector. Firstly, the critical state-significant infrastructure provisions of the current EPAA (effectively similar to the critical infrastructure provision under the previous Part 3A) will be carried forward into the new regime (NSW Government, 2012) , providing the Minister with the same flexibility to declare and fast-track infrastructure, including for water supply. This, however, leaves open the question about what mechanisms will ensure planning for cost-effective and sustainable water infrastructure.
Secondly, the Green Paper makes a clear statement that for 'public priority infrastructure' the place for balancing multiple objectives of water security, cost, and other environmental and social objectives lies at the strategic planning level, not within environmental assessment (EA) (NSW Government, 2012) . Within the broad range of definitions and applications of EA, this proposal represents a relatively narrow scope. It does not, for example, require the EA to consider other options, and does not enable environmental impacts that are only realised through rigorous assessment at the EA stage to form the basis for declining development approval. This is likely to raise concerns similar to those that have previously arisen in relation to EPAA 'concept stage' approval processes for state-significant infrastructure; through such processes, approvals based on limited information about impacts and with reduced review rights have alienated communities (EDO NSW, 2012) . As yet, there is little specific detail about appeal and review mechanisms available under the new system. This placement of limits on the EA in the pursuit of streamlining development-approval processes mirrors a general trend across Australian jurisdictions to limit 'green tape regulation' in order to reduce the costs to business (Lowe, 2012) . A question thus remains as to whether the strategic planning processes will be integrated with the Metropolitan Water Plan to provide a sound foundation for water infrastructure planning processes to adequately balance environmental objectives with the need to secure water supplies.
5.2.3. Contestability. The Green Paper also makes explicit a proposal to enhance contestability in order to encourage private-sector provision and operation of infrastructure networks, including urban water (NSW Government, 2012) . It identifies that implementing contestability will lead to cost savings and encourage innovation. It proposes that new access arrangements should be established to facilitate private-sector participation. IPART has agreed that contestability will facilitate benefits including removal of a potential bias towards traditional capital-intensive solutions (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012d) .
In the case of water, WICA provides the framework required for contestability outlined in the Green Paper. As described above, the frameworks for RoLR and potentially OoLR need to be further developed in terms of ensuring appropriate financial risk-sharing in the event of failure, so that customers can be assured of services for safe and secure water, and for wastewater. Overall, the contestability provisions of the Green Paper are wide-ranging but provide little specific detail. At least some industry leaders have previously argued that, for alternative sources of bulk water such as desalination and recycling, the potentially high costs of treatment and pumping for desalination and recycling and the large existing storages may not lend themselves to cost-effective private-sector involvement in service provision (Schott et al., 2008) . The Green Paper does not raise the possibility that it may not be appropriate, nor economically efficient, for some functions of the urban water industry to be open for contestability.
Water conservation
'As a result of the drought the community at large has changed the way it values water … Regulation is playing a key role in achieving water savings and will play a greater role in the future' (Sydney Water, 2011) .
'Prescribing the use of water efficient appliances in buildings obliges all consumers to use water efficient appliances … by restricting consumer choice, policies that either prescribe or encourage (through moral suasion) water savings lead to inefficiencies' (Productivity Commission, 2011).
Water savings initiatives for Sydney that are underpinned by legislation include targets for water use, establishment of water savings funds, restrictions of water use during drought, and mandatory water efficiency requirements.
Implementing water savings programmes
The Energy and Utilities Administration Act 1987 (NSW) (the EUA Act) establishes the basis for SWC and the NSW Government to fund and implement water savings programmes. The objects of the EUA Act in relation to water apply to the area of operations of SWC, and include: to reduce the demand for water; stimulate investment in innovative water savings measures; increase public awareness and acceptance of the need to save water; improve access to a wider range of water savings technologies; and encourage the use of non-potable water (EUA Act s 5(3)). The EUA Act establishes the Climate Change Fund, incorporating the previous Water Savings Fund (Energy and Utilities Administration Act 1987 (NSW) s 34) and since 2005 the Minister has required SWC to make annual contributions. In 2010-2011 SWC contributed over AU$23 million to the Climate Change Fund and received AU$6.7 million for its Demand Management programme (NSW Department of Environment & Heritage, 2012) . The EUA Act also requires local councils within the SWC area of operations to prepare and submit water savings plans for approval by the Minister (Energy and Utilities Administration Act 1987 (NSW) ss 34A, 34O).
Sydney Water also has specific water conservation conditions included within its operating licence. The conditions include requirements to maintain the level of drinking water supplied from all sources to less than 329 litres per person per day, limit the level of water leakage from its drinking water supply system, undertake and promote water efficiency programmes, and meet targets set for water recycling consistent with the objectives of the metropolitan Water Plan including as directed by the Minister (2010).
These underpin a robust approach to facilitating water savings in the Sydney area, and the water efficiency and conservation programmes implemented by Sydney Water have been commended by the Australian water industry and internationally for their innovative design and water savings achievements, and for their associated energy and greenhouse-gas savings. However, the regulatory approach that mandates SWC's implementation of water savings initiatives was found by the Productivity Commission to pose significant barriers to achieving economic efficiency, and to be a key area for further reform (Productivity Commission, 2011) . The argument is that mandatory targets for water savings are pursued through water efficiency programmes that restrict consumer choice and require government to 'pick winners'; that is, targets have the effect of arbitrarily favouring demand management, and preclude consideration and implementation of other potentially more cost-effective water supply options.
Nevertheless, without specific obligations mandating water savings programmes, it is not apparent how water efficiency, conservation, and other demand-management programmes that save water without requiring significant built infrastructure would be given equivalent consideration to supply-side options, irrespective of their relative cost-effectiveness. Water utilities as monopolies are in theory expected to act as profit maximisers, and hence the approach to price regulation is designed to prevent utilities from overpricing and seeking monopoly rents. In reality, however, utilities as government-owned enterprises are subject to political pressures and have been found by the Productivity Commission to tend towards underpricing and failing to generate adequate revenue for efficient investment in the systems (Productivity Commission, 2011) . The underpricing of water means that, without mandatory requirements for investment in water conservation programmes, there is little economic incentive for residents and businesses to limit their water use to economically efficient levels, although undoubtedly household and business actions are also influenced by considerations other than price.
Furthermore, as outlined earlier, the principal objectives of SWC as outlined in the Sydney Water Act 1994 (NSW) are to 'operate a successful business' and to earn a required rate of return on assets. IPART in its price determinations is required to consider whether services are being met in the most economically efficient way, and under recent price determinations the focus of efficiency gains is on minimising operating costs (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2012e) . Water conservation programmes rarely create significant assets but nevertheless require ongoing expenditure. With prices set to recover expenditure on assets, it is not clear how the incentives created by economic regulation would encourage utilities to implement cost-effective water savings programmes, if they were not otherwise mandated by regulation.
Restricting water use during drought
The Sydney Water Regulation 2011 (NSW) provides the Minister with discretionary powers to regulate or restrict the purposes, times, quality or methods of water use, if the Minister is of the opinion that it is necessary in the public interest and for the purpose of maintaining water supply (s. 18). These powers were exercised across NSW, including Sydney, during the restrictions' period of 2004 to 2006 (Chong et al., 2009) .
During the 2000s in Sydney and across other Australian cities and towns, there was widespread debate about the appropriateness of water restrictions in place. A divergent range of perspectives emerged from the community, urban water managers, government officials, and elected representatives (Chong et al., 2009) . Community surveys indicated support for at least the less stringent restrictions, and showed that these restrictions engendered a sense of community pride and were perceived to underpin equality of participation in saving water during drought (Chong et al., 2009) . The previous Chairman of IPART noted 'there is a high cost to drought proofing a city so that drought never has an impact' (Keating, 2006) ; and many in the water industry considered that water restrictions were a flexible mechanism to reduce demand quickly during drought, and delay the need for investment in costly infrastructure (Chong et al., 2009) . Nevertheless, the resultant overarching policy message since the drought is that any restriction on water use imposes costs on consumers, curtails economic efficiency and should not be included as a drought-response option (National Water Commission, 2011; Productivity Commission, 2011) . Given the apparent unassailability of this stance, it is not apparent that Ministerial discretion will be exercised to restrict water use in order to manage climate variability in the future.
Mandating water conservation in the home: BASIX
About 73 per cent of all water in Sydney is used in the residential sector, and water use in homes represents significant potential for saving water (Department of Environment, 2010). Water efficiency and conservation initiatives also reduce energy use and greenhouse-gas emissions associated with pumping water through the system; where water savings are achieved through a reduction of hot water use (such as through water efficient savings), the avoided energy costs and greenhouse-gas emissions can be substantial . Under changing and potentially drier climate conditions, water conservation measures would thus seem to be critical to achieving the goals of water security as well as reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.
In NSW, water conservation inside the home is mandated by the BASIX (Building Sustainability Index) scheme, which was established in 2004 and incorporated into the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). BASIX is incorporated into the SEPP -Building Sustainability Index (BASIX) (2004) and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Building Sustainability Index (BASIX) Regulation 2004. BASIX requires new residences, additions and alterations to be designed and built to use 50 per cent less mains water supply and produce 25 per cent lower greenhousegas emissions than standard building stock. The water savings achieved in BASIX via water efficiency of fittings and some fixed appliances were enabled by the introduction of the national Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Scheme, which requires certain products to be registered and labelled with their water efficiency in accordance with the standard set under the national Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Act 2005 (Cth).
On its introduction in 2004, BASIX was welcomed as an innovative mechanism to achieve sustainability outcomes, including water savings, in homes (Thorpe & Graham, 2009 ). However, savings targets have since been criticised for being too low and of limited scope, for example, by setting weaker targets for multi-unit housing and excluding renovations costing less than AU$50,000, and for not applying to the non-residential sector. Where the bar is set, in terms of water savings required, is determined by the BASIX scheme, because the SEPP also precludes any local environmental plan or development-control plan from imposing higher standards for energy or water consumption (Ghanem & Ruddock, 2011) .
Whether and how BASIX will be incorporated into the new planning regime and what scope local governments will have to set standards remain to be seen.
Voluntary programmes have the potential to deliver significant water savings. The voluntary, national Green Star scheme, administered by the not-for-profit Green Building Council of Australia, has been instrumental in driving developers to install water savings initiatives and recycling schemes to achieve five-star rating for their residential and commercial building and precinct developments. In recent years, achieving this rating has been critical to developers quickly securing premium tenants in an otherwise slow market. Nevertheless, the Green Star scheme has far less influence over smaller or individual residential developments or renovations, which are regulated by the minimum standards of BASIX.
Conclusion
The legislative and institutional arrangements underpinning the supply of urban water services in Sydney comprise many actors whose rules, roles, and responsibilities are interlinked but not always effectively integrated. In particular, there are various tensions between public organisations' multiple responsibilities as policy-makers, economic regulators, protectors of public health and the environment, planners, system constructors and operators, and facilitators of competition.
Given the heightened uncertainty of rainfall and run-off conditions expected under climate change, long-term, coordinated planning of urban water options by an entity charged with representing the public interest would seem paramount to effective balancing of water security, cost, sustainability, and other objectives. Planning and development-control laws as an instrument for fast-tracking essential infrastructure, for example, to respond to drought, would not be a required element to ensure water security if the overall governance framework supports an adaptive management approach to planning for and responding to climate uncertainty. There is little detail yet available for the forthcoming NSW planning regime to indicate whether or how an integrated approach to planning urban water systems will be supported.
WICA provides a legal framework for regulating potentially innovative private-sector solutions to recycling water as a rainfall-independent source of supply. What is clear is that private-sector involvement in establishing and operating a recycled water scheme requires extensive government oversight in regulating environmental and public health risks. Private-sector involvement in sewer mining and other schemes also potentially creates a complex role for government or utilities, as negotiators of commercial contracts on behalf of the public ratepayers. Whether the resultant risk-sharing agreements between ratepayers and private-sector participants, and the extent of government involvement in regulation, represent best value for money for the public has not been tested empirically. Furthermore, there is still an ongoing need for government involvement in integrated planning and investment for water security infrastructure. Outstanding questions remain about how coordination of public and private service provision will be achieved.
Programmes that aim to reduce water use would appear to successfully achieve water security, climate change mitigation, and, by delaying the need for system augmentation, potential cost savings. Mandatory obligations on utilities, local government and major water users to achieve water savings have been criticised because they, in principle, favour water conservation programmes over other potentially more cost-effective measures. While this may be the case in theory, the reality is that, in practice, without the regulatory requirement for utilities to invest in water conservation programmes, there would be limited economic incentive for major suppliers of water to encourage reduction in water use.
Ultimately, the introduction and expansion of the number of actors delivering urban water services are an ambitious experiment that continues to have great influence on the governance of the sector and the ways in which water services are planned for and provided. The original NCP-based hypothesis did not position competition per se as the ultimate goal, but rather as a means to achieve economically efficient delivery of water security. In terms of evidence for or against, it remains to be determined whether water sector security under climate change is adequately achieved through the complex sum of public investment, private-sector innovation, government agency planning, ministerial discretion over infrastructure approvals, administration of private-sector involvement, economic price regulation, and regulation to ensure that health, environmental and other public objectives are met. What is clearer, however, is that the experiment is continuing, having developed a self-perpetuating momentum of its own.
